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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether bank competition increases risk taking for the case of 
the Tunisian banks. Our data set covers nine Tunisian banks observed during the period 
from1980 to 2009 and we conducted an econometric model based on panel data 
estimations. The econometric results reveal the presence of a positive relationship between 
competition and bank risk taking. This shows that the functions of Tunisian banks remain 
based on the basic traditional activities and banks need to diversify their activities in safe 
functions to keep the banking sector stable and avoid bank failure.  
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Introduction 
 
The relationship between competition and bank risk taking has been analyzed by numerous 
authors and their results have provided conflicting conclusions.  In fact, while some studies 
found that higher competition decreases risk taking by banks (Schaeck and Cihak (2014), 
Kick and Prieto (2013), Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2007), Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005),).some other studies affirm the existence of a positive relationship between 
competition and bank risk-taking .( Soedarmono, et al  (2013), Repullo (2004), Caminal and 
Matutes (2002), Marquez (2002), Mishkin (1999), Besanko and Thakor (1992)). Furthermore, 
some other studies have found a nonlinear relationship between bank competition and the 
level of risk taking. For example, the studies of Jimenez and Saurina (2013), Tabak B. M., 
Fazio D., and Cajueiro D. O. (2012), Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), concluded that 
competition affects bank risk-taking in a non-linear way. 
These different results show that the relationship between competition and bank risk taking 
has not been unanimous. Moreover, most of the available studies analyzed this relationship 
for developed countries only.  Therefore, the motivation of our paper is to investigate whether 
bank competition increases bank risk taking for the case of the Tunisian banks.  
Tunisia is an interesting case study as it adopted various policy reforms since the eighties to 
improve the financial sector. Following the liberalization of finance and trade, Tunisia 
banking sector has become more attractive to foreign banks and the number of players 
increased drastically between 1985 and 1998. As a result, competition between banks 
increased and new financial institutions have been introduced into the market to provide 
financial, banking and insurance services to Tunisian households. While most of studies on 
Tunisia have been focused on the consequences of liberalization on the performance of banks, 
the current paper will focus on a new concern which is the possible relationship between bank 
competition and risk taking by Tunisian banks. To this end, we collected a data from the nine 
most important banks operating in Tunisia and we conducted a panel data modelling to test 
for the validity of this relationship. Our dataset covers the period from 1980 to 2009. 
Obviously, the empirical results confirm the positive liaison between competitions of risk 
taking. This could be explained by the fact that when competition increased, profit of banks 
decreased and these institutions have been forced to look for new activities to compensate the 
loss from the penetration of new competitors. It appears that the new activities are risky.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a literature review 
on the banking competition and risk taking. In Section 3, we describe our methodology and 
the model specification. Empirical results and discussion are given is section 4. Finally 
section 5concludes the results. 
2. Literature Review  
The debate on the relationship between competition and risk taking is not conclusive. The 
academic literature is abundant and the empirical evidence provides a series of contrasting 
results. Findings on this topic can be divided into three ranges. The first current of literature 
supports the negative correlation between the level of competition and the bank risk taking.  
On the contrary, the second current defends the positive association between the two variables 
while the third line of ideas has been based around the nonlinear relationship between 
competition and bank risk taking.  
The negative effect of bank competition on the level of risk taking has been analyzed by 
several studies. For example Keely (1990) shows that increasing competition erodes the bank 
charter values, resulting in a negative trade-off between competition and stability (Keeley, 
1990). In another study, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show how higher competition among 
banks might lead to a reduction in the overall level of bank risk taking: Higher competition 
reduces interest rate costs at the level of the borrowing firm, leading the firm to choose a safer 
project which ultimately generates safer banks. In another study, Boyd et al. (2007), based on 
two different samples find that less-concentrated banking markets are characterized by lower 
z-scores, an inverse measure of bank risk. 
Kick and Prieto (2013) have used a dataset provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank over the 
period 1994 to 2010 to test for the liaison between competition and risk taking. The authors 
have used the Lerner Index as a proxy for bank-specific market power. Their results support 
the view that market power tends to reduce the default probability and the riskiness of the 
banks. In contrast, by using the Boone Indicator they found strong support that increased 
competition lowers the riskiness of banks.  More recently, Schaeck and Cihak (2014) have 
conducted a panel data analysis for some European banks during the period 1995 to 2005 
using the Boone indicator to analyze the cost elasticity of performance by capturing the link 
between competition and efficiency. Their results show that in general, a negative effect of 
competition on bank risk for European countries.  
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In the other hand, the positive association between the level of competition and the bank risk 
taking constituted the major finding of several studies (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Schaeck et 
al., 2009; Allen et al., 2011). The study of Besanko and Thakor (1992) shows that the more 
the number of players in the banking system increase the more the deposit rates increases and 
the more the lending rates decrease.  When the lending prices are low; banks count on the 
quantities of credit. In this line of idea, banks can compensate the lower rate by the higher 
quantity distributed, which can lead to grant credit with insufficient guarantees. The study of 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) shows that strong competition reduces credit rationing and 
increase the distribution of credits. In this case, banks may be engaged in riskier operations 
which increase the level of risk taking. Another argument presented by Mishkin (1999) shows 
that a more concentrated banking structure is rewarded by government. This can create 
problems of moral hazard and encourage banks to take more risk, and consequently increasing 
bank fragility.  Another study conducted by Although, Marquez (2002) showed that an 
increase in the number of banks in a market disperses the borrower-specific information and 
results in both higher funding costs and greater access to credit for low-quality borrowers. For 
Repullo (2004) who made a dynamic model of imperfect banking competition to show that 
more competition leads to more risk-taking in the absence of regulation, risk-based capital 
requirements were found to effectively control the risk-shifting incentives in that model.  
Based on a sample of commercial banks in Asia during the period from 1994 to 2009, 
Soedarmono, et al.(2013) have found that a higher degree of market power in the banking 
market is associated with higher capital ratios, higher income volatility and higher insolvency 
risk of banks. In addition to the negative and positive relationship between competition and 
bank risk taking, a third association has been revealed in many researches. Using a sample of 
banks in 10 Latin American countries for the period from 2003 to 2008, Tabak, Fazio and 
Cajueiro (2012) have found that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way 
as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability. They concluded that 
Banks facing both high and low competition are, on average, lower level risk-takers than 
banks experiencing average competition. Using data for the Spanish banking system over the 
period 1988 to 2003, Jimenez and Saurina (2013) concluded that reducing competition in 
banking markets had been seen as promoting banking stability. This finding supports a 
nonlinear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in both the loan and 
deposit markets and confirms the results of Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012) and Martinez-
Miera and Repullo (2010). The depended variable which reflects the bank risk taking is the 
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level of nonperforming loan for the study of Jimenez et al (2013). However many proxies are 
used to measure bank competition such as the concentration index, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index, the Lerner index, etc.  
3. Data and Model Specification 
 
Our dataset covers the nine most important retail banks operating in Tunisia and they were 
observed during the period 1980–2009; hence we have a total of 270 observations. We use 
annual bank-level balance sheet and income statement data collected from the Tunisian 
professional association of banks (APTBEF, 2014). In this paper we use the following 
variables: The Z-Score; Net Interest Margin (NIM); the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration 
index (HHI), market share of each bank (MS), Intermediation (ITR); the deposit 
specialization ratio (DEP); the bank size (SIZE), The credit risk (CR), the liquidity Risk (LR) 
, inflation (Inf) and GDP per capita. The definitions of these variables are displayed in Table 1 
below. 
 
Table1. Definition of the variables  
 
Z-Score Defined as the ratio of the return on assets (ROA) plus the capital ratio (CAR) 
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets (SDROA) 
NIM Interest Income/Total Assets 
HHI Measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index. 
MS Is measured by total assets of the bank (i) to total bank assets of the sample. 
DP The deposit specialization ratio measures the weight of deposits of each bank in 
the total liabilities. 
ITR Is the ratio of interest expense to interest income 
SIZE Is the bank size measured by natural logarithm of total assets of each bank 
CR Is a measure of credit risk; it’s measured by Total Loans/Total Assets. 
LR is a proxy of liquidity risk; it is equal to Total Loans/Total Deposits 
INF The inflation rate measured by the CPI 
GDP In the Gross domestic product per capita 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used. The average net interest 
margin (NIM) is 2.95% with a maximum of 11.25% and a minimum of 0.37%.  The average 
Z-Score is 3.33% with a maximum value of 8.54% while its minimum value is -1.56%.   
6 
 
Banking concentration (HHI) average is 12.80% with a minimum of 10.95% and a maximum 
of 16.18%.  Despite the small number of institutions in the banking system, the sector has a 
low level of concentration.  
 
The average level of credit risk (CR) of Tunisian banks is about 60.74% with a higher value 
equal to 90.36% and 30.29% for the minimum value. The mean value of the Liquidity risk 
(LIQR) is 100.09%, its minimum value is 48.04% and 259.70% as maximum value. The 
average market share of Tunisian banks (MS) is 10.41%; with a maximum value is 29.18% 
while its minimum value is 0.59%.  The average value of bank intermediation (ITR) is 
53.26%; its maximum value is 97.75% while its minimum value is 27.77%. For 
macroeconomic variables, the average growth rate of real GDP per capita is 7.58%; its 
minimum value is 7.30% and 8.03% as maximum value and the average inflation is 5.37% 
which is relatively high in Tunisia. 
 
Table2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Zscore 270 3.336 1.213 -1.562 8.543 
Nim 270 0.0295 0.0130 0.0037 0.112 
Crisk 270 0.6070 0.1512 0.0302 0.903 
Liqr 270 1.096 0.4019 0.4804 2.597 
Size 270 14.634 0.5282 13.626 15.748 
Hhi 270 0.1280 0.4256 0.1099 0.1618 
Car 270 0.0737 0.0323 0.0109 0.1748 
Itr 270 0.5206 0.1314 0.1447 0.9461 
Ms 270 0.1041 0.0532 0.0059 0.2918 
Dep 270 0.1269 0.1118 -.1540 0.6371 
Inf 270 0.0323 0.0082 0.0216 0.0558 
Gdp 270 0.0338 0.0168 .01658 0.0631 
In the estimation procedure, we apply the panel data analysis. The econometric model can be 
written as follows:  
Following Laeven and Levine (2009); we use the Z-Score to measure the bank risk taking.  
We decompose the Z-Score in two components. The first component is the return on average 
(ROA) divided by the standard deviation of ROA as a measure of bank’s portfolio risk. The 
second component is the ratio of total equity divided by total assets over the standard 
         InfGDP + ,DP  +  MS  +HHI  +  ITR  
+ CAR +SIZE  +  LR  + CR   + PERF  + =  Score-Z
iti,11ti,10ti,9ti,8ti,7ti,6
ti,5ti,4ti,3ti,2ti,10 ti,
εββββββ
ββββββ
++
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deviation of ROA as a measures leverage risk.  Regarding the bank performance we use the 
Net Interest Margin (NIM). The later could be the best indicator of bank profitability in 
Tunisia as it reflects the magnitude of traditional activities in Tunisia during the past three 
decades and the volume of lending and deposit activities (Hakimi and Hamdi 2012).  
4. Empirical Results 
The correlation matrix displayed in Table 3 gives information on the level and nature of 
linkage between the variables. The results reveal a weak correlation between the different 
variables, and this rejects the existence of multicolinearity problem.  The correlation matrix 
shows that the Z-SCORE is positively linked to most of the variables except the liquidity risk 
(LR), the bank size (SIZE), the market deposit (DEP) and the inflation rate (INF). 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix  
        
Z-
SCORE 
 
NIM 
 
CR 
 
LR 
 
SIZE 
 
CAR 
 
ITR 
 
IHH 
 
MS 
 
DEP 
 
INF 
 
GDP 
Z-
SCORE 
1.0000            
NIM  0.0706 
 
1.0000           
CR 0.1053 0.1157 
 
1.0000          
LR -0.0049 -
0.2494 
0.5999 1.0000         
SIZE -0.0821 -
0.1182 
-
0.0570 
0.0905 1.0000        
CAR 0.1057 0.1340 0.2670 0.1865 -
0.1552 
1.0000       
ITR 0.1105 -
0.7160 
0.0177 0.1852 0.0756 -
0.3604 
1.0000      
HHI 0.1338 -
0.1254 
-
0.7167 
-0.3910 0.0060 -
0.1887 
0.1019 1.0000     
MS 0.2963 -
0.3318 
0.0340 0.2250 0.1876 0.0565 0.2024 0.0841 1.0000    
DEP -0.0048 -
0.1248 
-
0.2672 
-0.2069 0.0743 -
0.0098 
-
0.1729 
0.2338 0.1060 1.0000   
INF -0.0280 -
0.0343 
0.0560 0.0856 0.2855 -
0.0221 
0.0116 -
0.0502 
0.0052 -
0.0269 
1.0000  
GDP 0.0412 -
0.0116 
0.0091 0.0091 0.4073 -
0.0357 
-
0.0417 
-
0.0289 
-
0.0084 
-
0.0343 
0.3996 1.0000 
Note. This table reveals the correlation matrix between all the variables.  
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the random effect regression on the Tunisian 
banking sector. The net interest margin (NIM) acts positively on the bank risk taking (6.27) 
but the effect is not significant. As measured by the interest margin to total assets, this 
variable can increase the level of risk taking for the Tunisian banks since banks can grant 
loans to households with insufficient guarantees to search for high revenues. 
The credit risk (CR) seems to be positively and significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable. This association indicates that a higher level of credit risk is associated with a higher 
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level of bank risk taking. On the other hand, liquidity risk (LR) is negatively and significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable. This shows that when the liquidity is available, the 
risk appetite decreases.   
The bank size, capital adequacy ratio and the market deposit ratio have no significant effect 
on the bank risk taking. In this research, bank size is negatively correlated with the bank risk 
taking. In fact, it was shown in literature that banks with big size take more risk than small-
sized banks. However, as Tunisian banks are relatively small sized banks, so these small 
entities appear not being high risk takers.  
Turning now to banking intermediation ratio (ITR); it was shown to be positively and 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable.  Indeed, an increase on the received 
interests (lending interest rates) or a decrease in interest expenses (deposit rates) is likely to 
lead to more bank performance.  It should be noted that the increase in deposit rates should be 
roughly proportional to the decrease in lending rates. To search for more profitability, banks 
may raise the lending interest rates or the amount of distributed credit which reflects a high 
level of bank risk taking.  
The index of concentration (HHI) acts positively but not significantly on the dependent 
variable while market shares (MS) acts positive and significant at the level of 1 %.  This could 
be explained by the facts that when banks are searching for high market shares, based on the 
volume of distributed loans, banks may grant credits with insufficient guarantees. In this bank 
stability becomes a concern. Faced with a higher number of heterogeneous clients, banks 
cannot collect the necessary information, so the problem of information asymmetry will 
increase and this can lead banks to pursue riskier projects. This result confirms the finding of 
Kick and Prieto (2013).  
The effect of the two macroeconomic variables is not significant. The growth rate of GDP per 
capita (GDP) acts positively on the bank risk taking however, the inflation rate affects 
negatively the level of risk taking. In an inflationary context, banks limit their risks by giving 
up commitment in medium and long-term contracts, because inflation causes a redistribution 
of income in favour of borrowers and the detriment of lenders. In the Tunisian case, the 
increase of the credits is not a fundamental origin of inflation, which is caused by other 
factors. Therefore, we can conclude that inflation and GDP seem not to have a potential 
impact on the bank risk taking in the Tunisian context.     
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Table 4: Results of the Random Effect Model 
Zscore     Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
NIM    6.274 13.1422 0.4810 0.6332 
CK   1.599 0.9182 1.7404   0.0825* 
LR  -0.4493 0.2638 -1.7018   0.0894* 
SIZE   -0.1969 0.1646 -1.2021 0.2323 
CAR    4.139 2.622 1.581 0.1155 
ITR   2.134 0.9949 2.152     0.0321** 
IHH   2.442 6.729 0.3611 0.7174 
MS    6.810 1.475 4.621       0.000*** 
DEP   -0.01024 0.8347 -0.0154 0.9904 
INF   -2.851 9.333 -0.3186 0.7603 
GDP    6.915 4.925 1.404 0.1601 
_CONS    3.466 2.853 1.215 0.2241 
Hausman test 
Chi2 (10)                           =7.98 
Prob ˃ chi 2                       = 0.6304 
Breusch and Pagan test 
Chi2 (10)                           = 1.27 
Prob ˃ chi 2                       = 0.2599 
Wald test 
Wald chi2 (11)                  = 47.44 
Prob > chi2                        = 0.0000 
Number of observation   =   270                                                                                                                
***, ** and * significantly respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of in this paper is to investigate whether bank competition increases bank risk 
taking for the case of Tunisia. Our sample included the nine most important banks operating 
in the country since 1980 and we have performed a panel data regression with random effect 
specification. Overall results, confirm the idea that there is a positive relationship between 
competition and bank risk taking. This conclusion supports the findings of Soedarmono, W., 
Machrouh, F., and Tarazi, A. (2013), Repullo (2004), Caminal and Matutes (2002), Marquez 
(2002), Mishkin (1999), Besanko and Thakor (1992), etc. In Tunisia, bank suffers from 
various types of competitions and from market pressure as well. This increased level 
competition pushes banks to develop risky activities to compensate the loss of revenues. This 
risk taking by Tunisian banks reveals the reality of the banking system and the nature of 
banking activities which remain based on the basic activities such as granting loans, collecting 
credits and managing the payment systems. In this case, revenue of banks is mostly interest 
revenues. Hence, an increase of the players would automatically affect the performance of the 
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competitors and would particularly affect their margins. For the case of Tunisia, when the 
number of banks increase, the level completion increase as well and this will force banks to 
look for new sources of revenues. However, this policy could harm the stability of the 
Tunisian banking sector as a whole as it could generate bank failure.  Therefore, we 
recommend Tunisian policy makers to improve the financial infrastructure and to encourage 
banks to diversify their activities in non-riskier activities that could bring high added value.  
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